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Abstract: Safety-critical equipment depends on the study of functional, thermal, EMC (Electromagnetic 
Compatibility) and RAMS (Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety) fields. The variation of one 
area characteristic could result in a failure to fulfil safety requirements. Traditionally, thermal, EMC or 
RAMS issues were only considered once the design was done. This paper proposes a novel analogue 
equipment design methodology by studying these areas dependently from the beginning of the design 
process. Each area requirements and design parameters and the relation among them are defined 
qualitatively and quantitatively. Based on these dependences among all the areas, the cross-influence of 
each parameter variation in other areas requirements is demonstrated. The obtained results are intended to 
aid the fulfilment of requirements of the design of any safety critical analogue circuit, and to help designers 
to know beforehand the consequences of any change in the design, saving time and money. The application 
of this methodology in a SIL 2 RF transmitter is shown and the improvement and worsening of 
requirements depending on the parameters variation is exposed. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Signalling, communication and control systems are 
part of safety-critical systems included in a number 
of transport means, as aircraft and trains. Generally, 
from the design perspective there are four key areas 
for consideration in the design process of safety 
critical systems: functionality, temperature, EMC 
and RAMS.  
The design methodologies described in the 
literature take into account different variables. Some 
define methodologies for safety and EMC 
(Alexandersson, 2008) (Armstrong, 2006), others 
optimise reliability and cost constraints 
(Zafiropoulos, 2007), and others focus their efforts 
on the functional capability (Gilbert, 2005). All of 
them are valid depending on the system 
requirements and even can be compatible, but this 
paper proposes a more complete analysis. 
A new global methodology including 
temperature and EMC requirements, for reliability 
and safety critical systems is needed. This all-
inclusive methodology for system designs completes 
the state of the art supporting the robust design 
literature for analogue hardware. The four areas 
need to be considered in parallel moving forward in 
the same direction: the consideration of the 
multidisplinary requirements and their fulfilment in 
a control manner. 
The main goal of this work is to establish a 
design methodology to define and quantify the 
relation between the RAMS design parameters and 
requirements with the functional, thermal and EMC 
characteristics (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Relations between RAMS characteristics and 
functional, thermal and EMC characteristics. 
In this paper, the group of functional, thermal 
and EMC fields are identified by FTE acronym. So, 
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 FTE-RAMS term would be related to FTE design 
parameters  and  RAMS  requirements  analysis, 
whereas    RAMS-FTE    term    to   RAMS    design 
parameters and FTE requirements analysis. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
defines the four areas independently. Section 3 
introduces RAMS equations, while section 4 
analyses FTE-RAMS performance and RAMS-FTE 
analysis. The final equations of all these analyses are 
presented in section 5. Finally, section 6 describes 
the application of this methodology in the design of 
an RF transmitter, part of a safety critical system. 
And the conclusions are drawn in section 7. 
2 DESIGN PARAMETERS AND 
REQUIREMENTS 
In order to obtain the relationship among functional, 
thermal, EMC and RAMS parameters, it is first 
necessary to define the system requirements, and the 
design parameters of any analogue equipment. 
The reliability requirement is the Mean Time To 
Failure (MTTF). Whereas, safety requirement is 
defined as Tolerable Hazard Rate (THR). The two 
RAMS design parameters that are the failure rate of 
the components and the use of safety improvement 
techniques, as table E.4 of standard EN50129 
(CENELEC, 2005) defines. Two of these techniques 
are Built-In Self-Test (BIST) and redundancy. The 
former adds an extra parameter for the design: Mean 
Detection Time of the failure (MDT), and evidently, 
the reliability data of the components of the added 
topology have to be considered. 
The functional parameters and requirements 
strongly depend on the designed equipment type. 
The design parameter that most affects the reliability 
is the architecture of the equipment. Thermal 
requirements are the maximum and minimum 
operating ambient temperature. And thermal design 
parameters are components thermal resistance 
between junction and air or maximum junction 
temperature. EMC requirements are divided into 
immunity and emissions / radiated and conducted. 
The radiated limits are defined as the maximum 
electric or magnetic fields. The EMC design 
parameters consist of components insertion as 
components to avoid conducted interferences. 
3 RAMS ANALYSIS 
This analysis defines the relation between the 
RAMS parameters and requirements described in 
section 2. In most cases, the transmitter or receiver 
consists of a main chain and it is assumed that a 
single failure causes a system failure (Smith, 2000). 
The system MTTF is inversely proportional to this 
failure rate. 
In systems where no safety improvement 
technique is used, HR is equal to the failure rate of 
the safety function related to this hazard. Because of 
the high failure rate of some analogue components, 
it is usual not to accomplish at least one of the two 
RAMS requirements (MTTF and THR).  
The system MTTF with BIST is worse than the 
one without and system. HR with BIST depends on 
the included components failure rate (λiBIST), MDT 
and the occurrence rate of the event (rH) that can 
produce the hazard, as shown in (1) based on 
EN50129 (CENELEC, 2005). 
( ) HiBISTsystem r·MDT·∑+=HR λλ  (1) 
Another possible solution from the architecture 
point of view is the redundancy. The analyses of 
these architectures are done at length in different 
references, as in (Smith, 2000). 
4 FTE-RAMS AND RAMS-FTE 
ANALYSIS  
Once all the requirements are defined, the first stage 
of the system design is the architecture definition in 
order to fulfil functional requirements. System 
functionality can be achieved by means of different 
architectures. System failure rate of analogue 
equipment depends on the failure rate of each of its 
components. This information can be obtained from 
manufacturers or reliability databases (MIL-HDBK-
217F 1991). These values provide the information to 
know if the equipment fulfils the RAMS 
requirements. 
Thermal issues also affect system RAMS 
requirements, because depending on the operating 
temperature of the component its failure rate differs. 
The component failure rate is exponentially 
dependant on the junction temperature (Hnatek, 
2003). And, as shown in (2), in the case of a 
heatsink, thermal resistance between junction and 
ambient (RJA) is distributed among three thermal 
resistances (RJC, resistance between junction and 
case; RCH between case and heatsink; RHA between 
heatsink and ambient). 
( ) AHACHJCDJ TRRRPT +++= ·  (2) 
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 where PD is the dissipated power. 
All these parameters have a physical limit, 
therefore, once the best heatsink is chosen, the way 
to improve the resistance is the inclusion of air flow 
by means of a mechanical cooling system. The use 
of a fan is very common in this type of equipment, 
but the low MTTF of this type of components is its 
major drawback.  
In order to fulfil EMC requirements, radiated 
and conducted interferences have to be eliminated 
by means of the inclusion of extra components. The 
conducted interferences are eliminated using bypass 
capacitors. ESD protections are needed in all the 
external connectors of the system. As said 
previously, the insertion of all these components 
worsens the system MTTF and HR. 
It is crucial to know that the variations due to 
RAMS aspects affect the characteristics of the 
system regarding FTE performance (RAMS-FTE). 
Safety-aimed changes must not vary the system 
main functionality, but the characteristics of the 
system blocks may be varied if the new architecture 
needs them. As explained previously, the two 
possibilities analyzed in this work to improve system 
safety are the BIST and redundancy. Both 
techniques affect system consumed power and 
transmitted or received RF signal power. 
The need of including components in the 
transceiver chain results in a reduction of the 
transmitted power. Therefore, equipment 
characteristics need to be changed to obtain the same 
output power as in the absence of these techniques. 
Either BIST or redundancy implies the insertion 
of new components in the system and hence, new 
signals. These generate two types of EMC issues, 
interferences to the environment and interferences 
within the components of the system; both of which 
must be avoided. 
5 ANALYSIS RESULTS 
Once the causes and consequences among FTE and 
RAMS characteristics have been analyzed, RAMS-
FTE and FTE-RAMS (section 4) analyses results are 
gathered. Table 1 exhibits FTE-RAMS trends, where 
the columns show the requirements and the rows 
define the design parameters. The parameters trend 
is defined by means of – and +. The ↑ in the cells 
shows the improvement of the requirement while the 
↓ the worsening. 
In the case of BIST technology, the decrease of 
MDT (quantifiable parameter) makes the THR 
better, but, at the same time, the use of new 
components (non quantifiable) worsen some 
requirements. The advantage of BIST is the HR 
improvement, at the cost of worsening system 
MTTF. 
System MTTF is inversely proportional to the 
sum of the components failure rate. Therefore, the 
lower the BIST and EMC solution components 
failure rate is, the lower its effect in MTTF. 
Although, as shown in the next section, these 
components usually have a very low failure rate. 
Table 1: Effect on RAMS requirements. 
 RAMS req. 
THR MTTF 
Functional Chosen architecture  ↓ ↓ 
Temp. 
Thermal resistance - ↑ ↑ 
Max junction temp + ↑ ↑ 
Cooling mechanism + ↓ ↓ 
EMC 
Filter + ↓ ↓ 
Capacitances + ↓ ↓ 
ESD protections + ↓ ↓ 
As shown in (1), HR strongly depends on the 
MDT and rH. The shorter this period (MDT) the 
better the system HR, however the failure rate of the 
components included in the system is directly added 
to the failure rate of the system. So, a trade-off must 
be considered between the failure rate of the 
included components and the MDT. 
6 SIL 2 RF TRANSMITTER 
The methodology, based on studying functional, 
thermal, EMC and RAMS from the beginning is 
applied to a design of a SIL 2 RF transmitter. 
The system to be designed is an analogue 
transmitter for a signalling system located in a high 
speed train. RAMS requirements are defined by the 
railway safety requirements (UNISIG 2009). The 
minimum MTTF limit is defined as 5·105 hours. 
Whereas the safety requirement of the transmitter is 
given by the THR related to the safety related 
hazard. This THR for the transmitter is 2.2·10-8 
dangerous failures per hour. 
6.1 FTE-RAMS Analysis Results 
The basic architecture for this type of transmitter is 
based on a signal generator and different amplifier 
stages. By means of the failure rate of every 
component at 25ºC and 60% confidence level, the 
reliability data calculation can be obtained. It shows 
that the proposed architecture (first line of Table 2) 
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 accomplishes MTTF requirement, but HR is 10 
times higher than the THR. 
The environmental conditions (temperature) 
make the reliability data worse, as shown in the 
second line of Table 2. Moreover, other effect that 
must be included in the RAMS calculations is the 
inclusion of the components to mitigate 
interferences. These components effect is shown in 
the third line of Table 2, where MTTF and HR are 
12.5% worse. 
Table 2: Reliability data for four cases. 
 HR (f/h) MTTF (hours) 
Tx @ 25ºC 2.73·10-7 3.66·106 
Tx @ 50ºC 1.33·10-6 7.54·105 
Tx @ 50ºC + EMC 1.52·10-6 6.59·105 
Tx @ 50ºC +BIST+EMC 3.39·10-9 6.56·105 
Due to that reason, BIST is introduced (the rate 
of hazard occurrence is 400 times per hour and the 
used MDT is 40ms). Therefore, the calculated 
system HR and MTTF are shown in the fourth line 
of Table 2. Both requirements are accomplished, 
although the MTTF is slightly worse. All the values 
fulfil the requirement, but the MTTF decrease with 
the temperature, BIST and EMC is clear. 
Figure 2 shows the HR evolution, where the 
surface in the middle is THR. The lower surface is 
the HR with BIST and the one at the top HR without 
BIST. It can be seen that HR without BIST does not 
fulfil the requirement, while the BIST topology 
allows it be fulfilled. In both cases, HR value 
increases with temperature and the EMC solutions. 
6.2 RAMS-FTE Analyses Results 
From the RAMS-FTE analysis point of view, BIST 
technique implies the insertion of a power detector, 
which generates a power loss. So, it is necessary to 
increase the output power. Power consumption is 
also modified due to the components included and 
the need of transmitted power increases 3% the total 
consumption. 
 
Figure 2: HR evolution and comparison with the 
requirement (THR). 
The thermal characteristics due to the extra 
components included do not change significantly 
because the increase of the dissipated power is only 
3% of the total dissipated power. 
The last consequence of BIST technique is the 
variation of EMC characteristics. The self-test is 
done by means of digital systems, which may disturb 
the analogue system operation. In order to avoid any 
malfunction, capacitors have to be included. 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
In order to fulfil all the requirements that any safety 
critical equipment presents, this paper shows a 
design methodology that includes the study of 
functional, thermal, EMC and RAMS performance. 
This novel methodology allows the designer to avoid 
redesigns, due to non-considered issues, as typically 
happened with thermal and EMC matters. 
RAMS requirements, THR and MTTF, depend 
strongly on the chosen architecture and the thermal 
resistances of the components, while EMC solutions 
have less effect. On the other hand, RAMS 
parameters variation showed slightly worse results 
in a slight worsening of functional, thermal and 
EMC requirements, but all of them accomplish the 
limits. 
The proposed methodology is applied to a SIL 2 
RF transmitter located in a signalling system of a 
high-speed train, where the BIST technique was 
needed to attain THR. 
This design methodology was tested to use with 
a common goal: a safety-critical system global 
requirements fulfilment. 
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